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Financial modernization legislation passed in 1999 allows banking
organizations to directly invest in any type of company.This merchant bank-
ing authority gives banks greater opportunities to provide venture capital 
to start-up companies and later-stage equity financing to more mature
firms.Kenneth Robinson examines how banks have pursued their new mer-
chant banking powers. Robinson finds evidence that organizations that
engage in merchant banking tend to be larger than those that do not. His
findings are also consistent with the hypothesis that banks may be attempt-
ing to lower their average costs by combining merchant banking with other
nonbank activities. Allowing banking organizations to pursue this new activ-
ity will provide them with an additional source of earnings and greater diver-
sification opportunities and will likely increase private equity financing,
which has been a vital component of economic activity.
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portant pieces of banking legislation in more than fifty years. In addi-
tion to allowing banking organizations to engage in securities under-
writing and dealing and to offer insurance products, the bill grants them the
authority to undertake merchant banking activities. Merchant banking is
part of the private equity market in which firms directly invest in compa-
nies. The GLB allows financial holding companies (FHCs) to invest in any
type of business, not for the purpose of engaging in that business but 
to seek a return on their investment.
1 These investments can include seed
money to start-up companies as well as later-stage funding to more
mature firms.
Venture capital financing has been important to a number of suc-
cessful companies, such as Microsoft Corp., Intel Corp., Netscape Corp.,
and Genentech Inc. A recent study estimated that firms built with venture
capital were responsible for almost 6 percent of the nation’s jobs and 13
percent of U.S. gross domestic product in 2000 (National Venture Capital
Association 2001). Allowing FHCs to participate in this type of financing
will likely increase the flow of venture capital and later-stage funding that
has proven vital to a growing economy. It also offers FHCs a new source
of earnings and greater opportunities for diversification.
Because merchant banking is closely related to the mixing of bank-
ing and commerce, I begin by highlighting the key elements in the long-
standing debate over allowing U.S. banks and banking organizations to
own commercial firms.I then describe what FHCs are allowed to do in con-
ducting their merchant banking business and provide some evidence on
their growth and involvement in merchant banking. I follow this with an
examination of some of the characteristics of FHCs that have pursued
merchant banking. Because FHCs have only recently entered merchant
banking, making data limited, my findings should be viewed as a prelimi-
nary look at FHCs’ involvement in this new area. As more FHCs enter this
arena, and more data become available, different conclusions might be
reached.
My results indicate that larger organizations are more likely to
engage in merchant banking. I also find some evidence that economies of
scope—or the ability to achieve lower average costs by producing differ-
ent products within one organization—increase the likelihood of pursuing
merchant banking. Additional results suggest that the portfolio proportions
of FHCs’ merchant banking investments depend on institution size and
capital and are positively related to variables that proxy for the presence
of scope economies, such as business lending and the extent of nonbank
activities.
BANKING AND COMMERCE
Separation of banking and commerce is a long-standing characteris-
tic of the U.S. banking system. U.S. banks and bank holding companies
are not allowed to own and operate nonfinancial companies.This contrasts
with some other countries, such as Germany and Japan, that allow vary-
ing degrees of what are often called universal banks. The separation of
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1 Merchant banking activities must be conducted by a subsidiary of a financial holding
company. Banks and bank subsidiaries may make merchant banking investments only if,
five years after enactment of the GLB, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and the
Secretary of the Treasury jointly approve.
Tbanking and commerce in the United States has its roots in English bank-
ing law (Shull 1999). This separation has endured major changes in the
U.S. banking system, including the free banking era of the early to mid-
1800s, the establishment of a national banking system in 1863, and the
financial upheavals of the Great Depression. However, at various times
banks were able to circumvent restrictions on the comingling of banking
and commerce.
Bank holding companies have traditionally offered avenues for com-
mercial banks to expand into new activities. Prior to 1933, holding compa-
nies were not restricted by federal regulations. Consequently, the holding
company structure was used to combine banking and commerce.
2 Trans-
america is probably the best-known example. It controlled five banks, and
its nonbank subsidiaries included insurance companies, real estate and oil
development companies, and a fish-packing company (Shull 1994, 261).
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 and subsequent amendments in
1970, however, generally prohibited bank holding companies from owning
or controlling almost all kinds of nonbank firms.
3
Despite restrictions on mixing banking and commerce, banking
organizations were permitted to make limited investments in nonfinancial
companies even before the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act. Under the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956, banking organizations could hold up 
to 5 percent of the outstanding voting shares of any company and up to 
25 percent of the total equity (voting and nonvoting shares). To match
competition abroad, U.S. banking organizations can also invest in foreign
companies through Edge Act affiliates and subsidiaries. Under the Small
Business Investment Act of 1958, banking organizations may make equity
investments through what are known as small business investment corpo-
rations, which can be a subsidiary of either a bank or a bank holding com-
pany. These companies can hold up to 50 percent of a firm’s outstanding




The long-standing separation of banking and commerce in this coun-
try reflects policy concerns over perceived drawbacks of a less restrictive
approach. Proponents of separating banking from commercial activities
point to potential costs that could arise from allowing banks or holding
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2 Banks were also able to find ways around prohibitions on securities underwriting and
dealing by establishing state-chartered affiliates. See Shull (1999).
3 Savings and loans were treated differently, however. The Savings and Loan Holding
Company Act of 1968 permitted unitary thrift holding companies, or those that owned
only one thrift and met a “thriftness” test (a minimum percentage of assets in mortgages
and other specified securities), to engage in any activity through nonbank subsidiaries
(Shull 1999, 12). The GLB narrowed this exemption from the prohibition on mixing bank-
ing and commerce. No new unitary thrift holding companies are allowed to own commer-
cial firms. Preexisting unitary thrifts are permitted to maintain their commercial affiliations
but may not engage in any new commercial activities or transfer their right to mix bank-
ing and commerce.
4 See Code of Federal Regulations, Title 13, Section 121.102 for a description of how the
Small Business Administration establishes its size standards. A bank’s aggregate invest-
ment in the stock of a small business investment corporation is limited to 5 percent of
the bank’s capital and surplus. For holding companies, the aggregate investment is lim-
ited to 5 percent of the holding company’s proportionate interest in the capital and sur-
plus of its subsidiary banks.VOLUME 1, NUMBER 2, 2002 4
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companies to own and operate nonbanking firms. The first is the potential
for an excessive concentration of economic power. The resulting lack of
competition in both banking and commercial markets could be detrimental
to consumers.
Conflicts of interest could stem from joint ownership of banking and
commercial entities. A bank might be tempted to extend credit to a com-
pany in which it has an ownership interest regardless of the company’s
creditworthiness, in an attempt to assist the firm and increase its stock
value. Moreover, rival firms, unaffiliated with the bank, might be offered
credit only on unfavorable terms. A banking organization could purchase
the debt or equity securities of a firm it owns to temporarily raise the firm’s
value and provide it with funds to repay its bank loans. And a banking
organization might rescue a failing company by moving bad assets from its
nonfinancial subsidiary to the bank, thereby endangering bank safety and
soundness.
These conflicts of interest highlight one of the most important costs
associated with the affiliation of banks and commercial firms—the possi-
bility that such affiliations may increase moral-hazard incentives. These
incentives arise from deposit insurance and other features of the federal
safety net that may serve to increase banks’ risk-taking.This could lead to
an extension of the federal safety net to nonbank firms and activities,
potentially increasing taxpayer exposure. Capital requirements, firewalls, and
other supervisory actions can limit, but not eliminate, this possibility.
Despite these potential costs, certain benefits could also be derived
from mixing banking and commerce. These include greater diversification
from offering both banking and nonbanking products. There is also the
possibility of exploiting both economies of scale and scope. Economies of
scale are present if increasing the scale of production lowers average
costs. Scope economies also lead to lower average costs by producing
many products in an optimal or efficient combination. These cost savings
arise from the efficient sharing of inputs across multiple outputs.
Finally, mixing banking and commerce could reduce the agency
costs and information problems associated with bank lending. Commercial
borrowers typically have better information about their business than the
lending bank does. Banks then must expend resources evaluating and
monitoring borrowers. If a banking organization has significant equity hold-
ings in the borrowing firm, information gathering and monitoring are likely
to be less expensive (Shull 1999, 27; Saunders 1994, 231).
Gramm–Leach–Bliley and the Mixing of Banking and Commerce
Policymakers remain wary of eliminating the restrictions on mixing
banking and commerce but have nevertheless permitted certain forms of
ownership of financial and nonfinancial firms. The GLB allows consider-
able expansion of banking organizations’ investments in nonfinancial com-
panies, but it does not remove the prohibition against mixing banking and
commerce. In considering the merchant banking provisions, Congress rec-
ognized that some forms of commercial firm ownership by banking organ-
izations are the functional equivalent of providing financing for start-ups
and other small businesses. It was on this basis that Congress authorized
banks to engage in merchant banking (Meyer 2001).
The GLB defines permissible merchant banking investments as
those that meet two requirements: (1) investments may be held only long
enough to enable the resale of the investment, and (2) while the invest-
ment is held, the investing banking company may not routinely operate ormanage the commercial firm except as necessary to obtain a reasonable
return on the investment when sold. These requirements “further the fun-
damental purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act—to help maintain
the separation of banking and commerce and promote safety and sound-
ness” (Federal Register 2001, 8466). The GLB also limits bank funding 
of companies owned by the bank’s parent holding company and cross-
marketing activities between banks and companies owned by the same
financial holding companies.
What Can Banks Do?
The GLB grants authority to make merchant banking investments
only to FHCs.
5 The FHC must notify the Federal Reserve within 30 days
after commencing such investments or acquiring a company that does.
A banking organization may acquire any amount of ownership interest in
any nonfinancial firm, or what is known as a portfolio company.
The GLB specifically authorizes the Federal Reserve and the
Secretary of the Treasury to issue regulations implementing the new mer-
chant banking authority. Final rules for the conduct of merchant banking
were determined after a round of comment-seeking by the two agencies
and were effective February 15, 2001 (Federal Register 2001).
Permissible activities under the merchant banking authority focus on
the two major requirements to ensure the separation of banking and com-
merce.The first of these requirements concerns how long banking organi-
zations may hold their merchant banking investments.The merchant bank-
ing rules permit a ten-year holding period for direct investments in a
portfolio company and a fifteen-year holding period for investments in 
private equity funds.
6 The Federal Reserve may approve longer holding
periods on a case-by-case basis.
The second requirement in the GLB addresses FHCs’ involvement in
the management of their portfolio companies. While the GLB restricts
FHCs’ ability to routinely operate or manage companies held under their
merchant banking authority, the rules do allow some oversight. Repre-
sentatives of an FHC may serve on a portfolio company’s board of direc-
tors. Moreover, an FHC may enter into agreements that restrict any
extraordinary actions of a portfolio company (such as sales of major assets
or acquisitions of other companies) without prior approval.However, an FHC
officer or employee may not be an executive of a portfolio company, and
the holding company cannot restrict decisions by a portfolio company
made in the ordinary course of business.
The act does allow an FHC to routinely manage a portfolio company
in special circumstances. These occur when intervention is deemed nec-
essary to protect the holding company’s investment. Under these circum-
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5 A bank holding company may qualify as a financial holding company if each of its depos-
itory institutions is well managed and well capitalized. Each of the subsidiary depository
institutions must also have at least a satisfactory Community Reinvestment Act rating. In
addition, to conduct merchant banking activities, the financial holding company must
either control a securities affiliate or be one, or must control both an insurance under-
writer affiliate and an investment adviser affiliate (registered under the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940) that provides investment advice to an insurance company. This
requirement is relatively easy to fulfill, necessitating only notification to the Federal
Reserve within 30 days of commencing these activities.
6 Private equity funds are generally investment companies that are typically organized as
limited partnerships and that pool capital from third parties to invest in shares, assets,
and ownership interests in companies for resale.stances, the holding company must notify the Federal Reserve if it rou-
tinely manages a company for more than nine months. And the holding
company must, upon request, give the Federal Reserve a written record
describing the holding company’s involvement with management.
The final rule also contains several provisions designed to encourage
the safe and sound conduct of merchant banking activities. FHCs must
establish policies, systems, and procedures to monitor and address risks
associated with merchant banking. In addition, holding companies must retain
sufficient records to assess and monitor risk. The rules do allow FHCs sig-
nificant discretion in formulating policies and keeping records that best fit
their management style and the extent of their individual merchant banking
activities.
Capital Requirements
The amount of capital to allocate to merchant banking is controver-
sial. Originally, in March 2000, a 50 percent capital charge was proposed.
After more than 130 comments were received, a revised proposal was
submitted for comment in January 2001 (Federal Reserve Board and
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 2001). Under this proposal, the
capital charge would increase in steps as an FHC’s merchant banking
activity increased relative to its Tier 1 capital.Banking companies would be
required to hold 8 cents for every dollar in equity investments up to 15 per-
cent of Tier 1 capital and 12 cents for every additional dollar of equity
investments up to 25 percent of capital. For merchant banking investments
that exceed 25 percent of Tier 1 capital, the charge would be 25 cents 
per dollar of equity investments. This series of marginal capital charges 
is intended to reflect that as a banking organization devotes more of 
its resources to a potentially risky activity such as merchant banking, its
capital must also increase more than proportionately to ensure safety and
soundness. After reviewing approximately sixty comments, the federal
bank agencies adopted a final rule substantially similar to the revised 




Financial holding companies’ merchant banking activity mostly takes
place in the private equity market. In this market, transactions occur
largely in unregistered shares in both private and public companies. In
return for their investment, investors receive an interest in the company,
generally through common or preferred stock. Because their interest is
subordinated to that of any debt holders, investors face potentially greater
risk, but returns can also be substantial.
Much activity in private equity markets occurs in unregulated venues,
so data on market size are difficult to obtain. However, estimates suggest
that the private equity market expanded rapidly throughout the 1990s. In
1991, private equity firms raised $8 billion for their investments. Private
equity firms are estimated to have raised $95.5 billion by 1999 (Asset
Alternatives 2001). And recent estimates put the amount of private equity
outstanding at approximately $400 billion (Meyer 2000).
7
VOLUME 1, NUMBER 2, 2002 6
ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL POLICY REVIEW FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS
7 For more on the private equity market, see Fenn, Liang, and Prowse (1997).Several venues exist for private equity investing. Until the late 1970s,
such investments were mostly undertaken by wealthy individuals, financial
institutions, and industrial corporations investing directly in the securities
of issuing firms.Since the early 1980s, most private equity investments flow
through specialized intermediaries, and most of these are organized as
limited partnerships (Prowse 1998). The best known are the venture capi-
tal firm Kleiner, Perkins, Caufield, and Byers and the buyout group
Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts and Co. Other professional private equity man-
agers include affiliates of insurance companies and investment banks
(Fenn, Liang, and Prowse 1997). By investing through a partnership rather
than directly in the issuing firms, investors are delegating the labor-intensive
responsibilities of selecting, structuring, managing, and eventually liquidat-
ing private equity investments.
Private equity transactions also occur in less-organized markets,
including the informal private equity market and the angel capital market.
In the informal private equity market, unregistered shares are sold to insti-
tutional investors and accredited individuals. This market also includes
Small Corporate Offering Registrations issued by small firms directly to the
public. These issues are exempt from registration with the SEC.
Angel capital consists of investments in small, closely held compa-
nies by wealthy individuals who often have experience operating similar
companies. Angel finance differs from most other categories of external
finance in that generally, this market is not intermediated. Instead, individ-
uals invest directly in small companies through an equity contract (Berger
and Udell 1998, 630). According to a survey in Prowse (1998, 788), angels’
investments can be as low as $50,000 and as high as $1 million. Angel
investors generally demand less control and oversight of their investments
than most venture capitalists (Berger and Udell 1998).
Venture Capital
One particularly important component of the private equity market 
is the venture capital segment. Venture capital investments carry the
greatest risk (and potential return) in the private equity market. Such
investments often focus on high-growth, evolving industries, including
information technology, communications, and biotechnology.
8
Venture capitalists are active investors in that they monitor their firms’
progress, sit on their boards, and allocate financing. Hellmann and Puri
(2002) present evidence that venture capitalists provide support in build-
ing up the internal organization in such areas as human resources policies
and the hiring of senior-level executives. Venture capitalists tend to spe-
cialize in a narrow set of industries in which they can develop expertise,
and they often control concentrated equity positions in the companies they
finance (Barry et al. 1990). Typically, start-up funds are not provided all at
once but are dispersed in rounds based on the achievement of certain
milestones.Venture capitalists usually exit their successful investments by
taking them public (Gompers and Lerner 2000). In short, venture capital-
ists play an important role in shaping and governing new firms (Barry et al.
1990).
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8 Gompers and Lerner (1999) provide a comprehensive overview of the venture capital
industry.Figure 1 shows the amount of venture capital investments in U.S.
companies from 1991 through 2001. These investments expanded rapidly
in the late 1990s. Mirroring the overall slowdown in equity markets gener-
ally, venture capital fund-raising declined in 2001.
FHCs AND MERCHANT BANKING ACTIVITY SO FAR
Presence
As of March 2000, FHCs report the total carrying amount of assets
held under the merchant banking authority of the GLB. These data do not
distinguish between venture capital investments and other private equity
market activity. Figure 2 shows that FHCs’ merchant banking investments
increased steadily in 2000 before declining a bit in 2001. Also, banking
organizations are not yet substantial players in the private equity market.
Currently, only twenty-four of 565 financial holding companies report mer-
chant banking activities. And FHCs’ outstanding merchant banking invest-
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SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, Supplement to the Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank
Holding Companies, FR Y-9CS.ments total $8.2 billion compared with private equity outstanding that is
estimated to exceed $400 billion.
Characteristics
To investigate the characteristics of banking organizations that have
decided to pursue merchant banking activity, I estimate a statistical model
to explain the possible factors behind this decision.The sample consists of
all financial holding companies that filed the FR Y-9CS, Supplement to the
Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies, in fourth
quarter 2001.
9 This form includes an entry for merchant banking invest-
ments.
Several variables are used to test various hypotheses about why
FHCs decided to pursue merchant banking activity. The first is SIZE,
defined as the log of the FHC’s consolidated assets. The hypothesized
effect of this variable is positive, indicating that larger organizations are
more likely to pursue merchant banking activities.
10 This reflects the addi-
tional capital requirements associated with merchant banking plus the
need to devote extra resources to managing the investments held under
the merchant banking authority. These requirements may be easier to ful-
fill for larger organizations.
There are also possibilities for exploiting economies of scope in pur-
suing merchant banking. FHCs’ lending to small and intermediate-sized
businesses allows them to have contact with a large number of firms in
which they might make equity investments (Fenn, Liang, and Prowse
1997). Such a large customer base could reduce average search and
monitoring costs associated with pursuing merchant banking. Therefore, 
I consider LOANS, which is total consolidated loans expressed as a per-
centage of total consolidated assets, and C&ILOANS, defined as the ratio
of commercial and industrial loans to total loans on a consolidated basis.
These variables are intended to reflect the possibility of synergies between
banking organizations’ lending activity and the decision to pursue mer-
chant banking. If scope economies are present from these synergies, then
I expect a positive effect from these variables on the decision to pursue
merchant banking.
To account further for the possibilities of scope economies, I include
NONBANK, the combined nonbank, nonthrift assets of nonbank sub-
sidiaries of the FHC, less merchant banking assets, expressed as a pro-
portion of consolidated assets. The greater the proportion of these non-
bank assets, the greater the potential for exploiting scope economies.
Therefore, a positive effect of this variable on the decision to engage in
merchant banking would be consistent with holding companies attempting
to pursue scope economies with their merchant banking activities.
However, this variable could also proxy for the overall complexity of the
banking organization. More complex organizations could be more likely to
engage in new powers irrespective of the ability to exploit economies of
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9 U.S. bank holding companies that have submitted a declaration to become a financial
holding company and whose declaration has been determined to be effective as of the
reporting period must file the FR Y-9CS.
10 Some analysts argue, though, that small FHCs may be expected to pursue merchant
banking activities in the future, especially by investing in local companies in which they
already have relationships. See Agosta (2001).scope. Thus, NONBANK is only meant to serve as a potential indicator of
economies of scope as a factor behind merchant banking.
Finally, to control for both regulatory factors and financial condition, 
I include CAPITAL, the ratio of equity capital to assets. A positive influence
from this variable would indicate that institutions with more capital are
more likely to engage in merchant banking activities.
Table 1 contains summary statistics for the variables used in this
analysis for FHCs with and without merchant banking activities.These sta-
tistics include the mean of each variable; the median; and the standard
deviation, which is a measure of dispersion. The last column provides a
statistical test—the t statistic—indicating whether the means from the two
groups are statistically different.
Based on the sample means, the average SIZE of FHCs in merchant
banking is substantially larger than the average SIZE of those not report-
ing any merchant banking, as expected.
11 Organizations pursuing mer-
chant banking report a smaller average proportion of LOANS but a higher
proportion of C&ILOANS.M erchant banking FHCs have significantly
greater mean proportions of NONBANK assets than those without merchant
banking activities, as expected. The mean CAPITAL ratios between these
two sets of banking organizations are quite close. FHCs with merchant
banking report a slightly higher capital ratio, but this difference is not sta-
tistically significant.
A similar pattern is found for the median values of these variables.
The only exception is with CAPITAL.T he median capital-to-asset ratio is
higher at FHCs with no merchant banking activity.
Calculating means and medians can be informative, but it does not
allow for interaction among these related variables. Therefore, I also con-
duct more formal statistical tests that can estimate simultaneously the
marginal effect of each individual variable on the decision to pursue mer-
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FHCs reporting FHCs reporting no
merchant banking activities merchant banking activities
Standard Standard
Variable Mean Median deviation Mean Median deviation t statistic
SIZE $189.5 $80.7 $262.1 $2.8 $0.272 $14.7 16.28***
LOANS 44.52 49.21 20.75 61.88 63.89 13.5 5.99***
C&ILOANS 30.36 31.28 11.33 18.31 16.3 11.15 5.17***
NONBANK 27.94 14.36 30.35 1.43 .01 7.23 13.56***
CAPITAL 12.19 7.8 16.69 11.76 9.75 5.84 .31
*** statistical significance at the .01 level.
NOTES: SIZE is in billions of dollars; all other data are percentages. t statistic is the test statistic for a difference in
means test. Data for merchant banking activities are from the Federal Reserve System, Supplement to the
Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies—FR Y -9CS. NONBANK is from the
Federal Reserve, Parent Company Only Financial Statements for Large Bank Holding Companies—
FR Y-9LP, or the Federal Reserve, Parent Company Only Financial Statements for Small Bank Holding
Companies—FR Y-9SP. Remaining data are from the Federal Reserve, Consolidated Financial State-
ments for Bank Holding Companies—FR Y-9C, where available.The consolidated data for non-Y-9C filers
were obtained by summing bank, nonbank, and parent-only data. All data are from fourth quarter 2001.chant banking, holding the other variables constant. Three specifications,
or statistical models, are estimated. Each of these specifications includes
SIZE, NONBANK, and CAPITAL.T he first of the three models includes
LOANS, the second includes C&ILOANS, and the third includes both of
these lending variables. The results from estimating these models are
found in Table 2.
In all three models, SIZE is positive and statistically significant, as 
expected, meaning that larger FHCs are more likely to pursue merchant
banking, after accounting for other variables in the model. NONBANK is
positive and significant in the specification including C&ILOANS and 
marginally significant (at the .10 level) in the model that includes both
measures of lending. When considering the lending variables, only
C&ILOANS is statistically significant, and the sign is positive, as expected.
Organizations with greater proportions of C&ILOANS and NONBANK are
more likely to pursue merchant banking activities. This could reflect that
greater amounts of business lending and other nonbank activities—such
as securities underwriting and dealing—may be combined with merchant
banking activities to lower average costs. If so, these results provide evi-
dence consistent with the hypothesis that the possibility of exploiting
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Table 2
Probit Models of Merchant Banking Activities
Variables (1) (2) (3)
CONSTANT –7.961*** –8.448*** –7.987***
(1.334) (1.136) (1.377)






NONBANK .008 .017** .015*
(.007) (.007) (.008)
CAPITAL .020 .013 .011
(.014) (.014) (.015)
Log likelihood –45.191 –42.788 –42.623
Observations with dependent 541 541 541
variable equal to 0
Observations with dependent 24 24 24
variable equal to 1
*** statistical significance at the .01 level.
*** statistical significance at the .05 level.
*** statistical significance at the .10 level.
NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses. A probit regression is estimated where the dependent variable 
equals one if a financial holding company reported merchant banking assets, zero otherwise. See Greene
(1993, 636–42). Data for merchant banking activities are from the Federal Reserve, Supplement to the
Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies—FR Y -9CS. NONBANK is from the
Federal Reserve, Parent Company Only Financial Statements for Large Bank Holding Companies—
FR Y-9LP, or the Federal Reserve, Parent Company Only Financial Statements for Small Bank Holding
Companies—FR Y-9SP. Remaining data are from the Federal Reserve, Consolidated Financial State-
ments for Bank Holding Companies—FR Y-9C, where available.The consolidated data for non-Y-9C filers
were obtained by summing bank, nonbank, and parent-only data. All data are from fourth quarter 2001.scope economies increases the likelihood of an FHC engaging in mer-
chant banking.
Portfolio Proportions
To identify whether these same factors explain the proportion of mer-
chant banking investments found in an FHC’s portfolio, I estimate another
statistical model employing the same variables. Now, though, the focus is
on explaining the amount of an FHC’s merchant banking investments
expressed as a proportion of consolidated assets rather than just the deci-
sion whether to pursue merchant banking.
Table 3 shows the results from estimating this model using the same
three specifications found in Table 2. Once again, SIZE is positive and 
statistically significant in the three specifications. Larger FHCs have
greater portfolio proportions of merchant banking investments. Now, though,
CAPITAL is also positive and significant, indicating that FHCs with greater
amounts of capital relative to assets report higher proportions of merchant
banking assets. The significance of the capital variable in explaining the
amount of merchant banking investments could reflect the capital charge
associated with this activity.
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Table 3
Tobit Models of the Proportion of Merchant Banking 
Activities in FHCs’ Portfolios
Variables (1) (2) (3)
CONSTANT –38.571*** –38.163*** –36.809***
(11.997) (11.468) (11.620)






NONBANK .062 .086* .078
(.047) (.049) (.051)
CAPITAL .255*** .230*** .221***
(.055) (.064) (.072)
Log likelihood –102.188 –99.523 –99.466
Left censored observations 541 541 541
Uncensored observations 24 24 24
*** statistical significance at the .01 level.
*** statistical significance at the .05 level.
*** statistical significance at the .10 level.
NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses.The dependent variable is the amount of merchant banking 
investments, expressed as a percent of consolidated assets. A Tobit model is estimated because a 
large number of financial holding companies report no merchant banking activity. See Greene (1993, 
694–706). Data for merchant banking activities are from the Federal Reserve, Supplement to the
Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies—FR Y -9CS. NONBANK is from the
Federal Reserve, Parent Company Only Financial Statements for Large Bank Holding Companies—
FR Y-9LP, or the Federal Reserve, Parent Company Only Financial Statements for Small Bank Holding
Companies—FR Y-9SP. Remaining data are from the Federal Reserve, Consolidated Financial State-
ments for Bank Holding Companies—FR Y-9C, where available.The consolidated data for non-Y-9C filers
were obtained by summing bank, nonbank, and parent-only data. All data are from fourth quarter 2001.LOANS is not statistically significant, similar to the models attempt-
ing to explain the decision to pursue merchant banking. C&ILOANS is
positive and marginally significant both in the model that includes only this
measure of lending and in the model that uses both measures. NONBANK
is also positive and marginally significant in the model using C&ILOANS.
FHCs that report greater proportions of C&ILOANS and those for which
NONBANK activities are more important report greater proportions of 
merchant banking activities. This result is similar to that of the decision
models and suggests a role for scope economies in explaining the portfolio
proportions of merchant banking activities.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
U.S. banking organizations have been prohibited from participating in
the private equity market except on a limited basis. Recent legislation now
allows financial holding companies to take unlimited ownership interests in
any type of nonfinancial firm. Results presented here indicate that FHCs
that have chosen to pursue merchant banking tend to be larger and are
possibly enjoying economies of scope from such activities. When examin-
ing the amount of merchant banking activity undertaken, size is again an
important factor and so is the level of capital in the banking organization.
In addition, variables that proxy for economies of scope—especially the
proportion of business loans and nonbank assets—are of some impor-
tance in explaining the portfolio proportions of merchant banking activities.
The private equity market has been an important source of financing
for some of the most successful firms in recent history. Allowing financial
holding companies to participate in this market gives rise to some poten-
tially beneficial outcomes. However, a concern of policymakers is the 
possible extension of the safety net to cover more activities. While greater
capital requirements, firewalls, and enhanced supervision can mitigate 
this potential extension, it is impossible to contain completely. Overall,
though, this deregulation of U.S. financial markets will likely increase the
flow of private equity financing and offer financial holding companies
greater diversification and earnings opportunities. The result will be a
stronger financial system with more avenues for financing entrepreneurial
enterprises.
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